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There is data evidence that welfare has improved post democracy in Nigeria. How-
ever, the distribution or concentration of the beneﬁts of democracy in subgroups of
the population is unknown. In this paper, the question of diﬀerential welfare im-
pacts, across interest groups post democracy in Nigeria, is explored. I break down
the population into interest groups along the lines of gender, sector, region, age co-
hort and education. The analysis shows these groups all beneﬁtted from reforms post
democracy but the magnitude diﬀered signiﬁcantly. In addition, the results show that
having a tertiary education yields signiﬁcant beneﬁts. I ﬁnd that individuals with
tertiary education are the big winners post democracy in Nigeria.
Keywords: democracy, disparities, gender diﬀerences, returns to education, in-
stitutional change
For most of her independent life, Nigeria has been controlled by military govern-
ments. Between 1986 and 1998, Nigeria experienced its worst political regimes since
its independence. Political instability, extractive institutions, pervasive corruption,
lack of security and poor governance were the hallmarks of this period. Moreover,
labor markets were stiﬂed and wages were sometimes compressed and controlled by
the military government. The last of these military regimes ended abruptly with
the death of General Abacha in 1998. In May 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo became the
president of Nigeria ushering in the present democratic dispensation. The period
between 1999 to present is the longest stretch of democratic government in Nigeria.1
The democratization of Nigeria led to signiﬁcant political, economic and insti-
1tutional reforms. Also, several policies and program were put in place to empower
woman, improve education, encourage investments, and improve health and labor
market outcomes. There is evidence from annual data that on an average, welfare
has improved in Nigeria post democracy [FOS, 2004]. However, there is anecdotal
evidence that these economic beneﬁts are being enjoyed by only a few selected groups
in the population [Sesay, 2007]. Besides, some Nigerians believe that some interest
groups are actually fairing worse post democracy. In this paper, claims of inequality
in beneﬁts post democracy with respect to labor market outcomes and other welfare
indicators are investigated. Speciﬁcally, I answer two questions. First, are there sub-
stantial subgroup diﬀerences in the welfare impact of democracy? Second, are there
winners and losers post democracy in Nigeria based on these diﬀerences? The labor
market indicators/outcomes I consider are wages, probability of employment, returns
to education, inequality and poverty measures. The groups of interest compared with
respect to these indicators are: gender (male vs female), sector (urban versus rural),
region2, birth cohort and education attainment groups.
To answer these questions, ﬁrst, the average income before and post democracy
for the diﬀerent subgroups of the population considered is estimated. Next, I compute
the level of poverty and severity of poverty for each period using the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) index (Foster et al, 1984). Third, I estimate the before and after
Gini coeﬃcient for each subgroup. Finally for each interest group, the probability
of employment and the returns to education are estimated using econometric tech-
niques. For each of these measures of welfare, I compute the percentage change in
the measured coeﬃcient over the two time periods. Conclusions on the existence of
disparities in welfare outcomes post democracy, are based on these results. Potential
2losers and winners post democracy in Nigeria are then characterized based on the
magnitude of these diﬀerences.
The results show that though welfare increased on average post democratic re-
forms in Nigeria, there are substantial disparities across groups. In addition, I ﬁnd
those with tertiary education and those from the Northeastern part of the country are
the big winners post democracy. Post democracy in Nigeria, mean income for those
with tertiary education increased by 52% and returns to tertiary education increased
by 57%. Similarly for the Northeast, mean income increased by 40% and average
returns to education (ARTE) increased by 58%. The large increase in welfare of the
tertiary educated is not unexpected given that many government reforms focused
largely on this group. What is surprising is the substantial economic improvement
in the Northeastern region. Possible reasons for these are: government distributional
bias, networks, interest groups and politicians favoring one region over another. How-
ever, these potential explanations are speculative and need further examining. Third,
I ﬁnd that besides the between group disparities in beneﬁts post democracy, there
are signiﬁcant increases in inequality within groups. Two unexpected groups that ex-
perienced increase in inequality are women and rural dwellers. Inequality increased
by 20% among women and 16% among those living in the rural sector.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence of the
disparity in impact of institutional change for subgroups of a population. There are
many theoretical papers on the impact of regime or institutions change on economic
indicators. However, empirical evidence is not as common especially for developing
countries. This paper adds to the limited empirical literature for developing countries.
In addition, this paper provides evidence of subgroup disparities in the economic
3impact of reforms in Subsaharan Africa. The analysis is the ﬁrst of its kind for an
African country. The results provide information that is useful for policy design,
redistributive eﬀorts and program targeting in Nigeria. These are especially relevant
as Nigeria begins its next democratic dispensation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section I review
the relevant literature and highlight the interest groups being considered. In section 3
I brieﬂy describe Nigeria pre and post democracy and the data is presented in section
4. Section 5 highlights initial data analysis. In section 6 the measures of welfare used
in the analysis are described in detail. Section 7 presents the results and the last
section provides implications, concluding remarks and policy recommendation.
Related Literature
According to Pommerehne (1978), a more democratic system, is likely to produce
political outcomes that are closer to the preferences of the median voter than a
less democratic system. Consequently, a shift to democracy or a shift in institution
towards more democratic institutions can be expected to raise individuals’ well-being
ceteris paribus.
There already is an extensive literature on the economic eﬀects of democracy,
levels of democracy, shifts to democracy and change in institution. Some papers
within the literature have looked within countries while others have looked across
countries. For example, Milanovic (2005) ﬁnds that own democracy has a signiﬁcant
positive impact on growth, which increases as a country’s income goes up. Dorn
et al (2005) look at the relation between democracy and perceived subjective well-
being, in a cross-national analysis covering 28 countries, using data from the 1998
4International Social Survey Program (ISSP). They ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
relationship between democracy and well-being even after controlling for numerous
aspects, especially culture and income. Fleisher et al (2005) is another example
of similar analysis. This paper is unique because it shows speciﬁcally the impact
of change in institution on a labor market outcome, returns to education. Their
analysis makes use of metadata from 33 studies of ten transition economies covering
a period from 1975 through 2002. They explore the pace of increase in return to
schooling during the transition from planning to market economies over time. The
data sample includes several Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and
China. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that most of these transition economies had low
returns to education until the 90s. Estimated returns before reform were less than
5% in all countries except Hungary and Slovenia, which operated under less rigid
economic regimes than did most of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia (CEER). More importantly, they ﬁnd that post-economic reform and change
in institutions consistent with a move towards a market economy, returns to education
rose signiﬁcantly in these countries.
There are also papers that look at distributional beneﬁts of changes in institu-
tions or the inﬂuence of speciﬁc institutions on redistribution among groups in the
population. Early empirical studies of the 60’s and the 70’s that looked at the rela-
tionship between democracy and inequality was comprehensively surveyed by Sirowy
and Inkeles, (1990). They conclude based on their review of 12 previous studies
that political democracy does not widely exacerbate inequality. Sirowy and Inkeles,
(1990) result is quite diﬀerent from the ﬁndings of Gradstein and Milanovic (2004),
who surveyed the more recent literature. They conclude that the recent evidence
5indicates an inverse relationship between measures of democracy, based on civil lib-
erties and political rights, and inequality. Interestingly, there are some exceptions
in the literature to this inverse relationship. Take for example, Milanovic et al’s
(2001) cross-country empirical analysis, covering 126 countries from 1960–98. They
ﬁnd that in Judeo-Christian societies, increased democratization appears to lead to
lower inequality. In contract, in Muslim and Confucian societies, it has an insigniﬁ-
cant eﬀect. Inequalities among diﬀerent forms of democracies has also been studied.
For example, Feld et al (2006) addressed this issue using information from the Swiss
federal tax oﬃce. They ﬁnd that inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct
than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution.
Apart from empirical evidence, the link between diﬀerences in institutions and
economic outcomes like inequality has been discussed theoretically. Lipset (1959)
and Lenski (1966) both present the theoretical case on the link between democracy
and inequality in the mid 20th century. More recently, Feld et al (2006) show that in
more representative democracies, ineﬃciencies in income redistribution might occur
as actual redistribution deviates from the preferred level, and this could lead to
beneﬁts from groups which are not the neediest ones. Similarly, Besley and Coate
(2003) use a model to show that representatives might follow the interests of the
bureaucracy and redistribute income in their favor. There are many other papers that
consider theoretically and empirically the relationship between income or inequality
and democracy.3 It is not necessary to go over all these papers as the review papers
mentioned earlier highlight many of these.
Unfortunately, despite the large related literature on democracy and its impact,
most papers have focused on the relationship between democracy and income, trans-
6fers or inequality. Very few papers look at the relationship between democracy or
institutional change and other economic indicators/outcome. Fleisher et al (2005) is
one of such papers while Cao and Nee (2005) examines inequality and other indica-
tors.4 There are several possible explanation for focusing on income or inequality as
against other welfare measures. One explanation could be the lack of theoretically
economic arguments, for a relationship between democracy and other indicators, to
serve as a basis for analysis. It is also important to mention that most of the papers
above are based on developed countries or on cross-country regressions that include
very few African countries. This is one reason why the simple analysis in this paper is
useful. A developing country in Africa is considered and evidence of disparate impacts
of democracy on subgroups of the population, using several economic indicators, is
highlighted.
Description of Datasets
This study makes use of cross-sectional data from the General Household Survey
(GHS) of Nigeria. The GHS is one of the major sample surveys carried out by
the federal oﬃce of statistics (FOS). This survey is a supplemental module of the
National Integrated Survey of Households (NISH), which is run in line with the
United Nations Household Survey Capability Program. The survey sample was drawn
randomly from all the 36 states in Nigeria including the federal capital territory. The
NISH sampling design is a two-stage replicate sample method, which is a common
random sampling procedure. It is the only survey in Nigeria that resembles the Living
Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) of the World Bank in terms of coverage.
The federal oﬃce of statistics in Nigeria conducts this survey yearly and data are
7collected from randomly selected households during the four quarters of the year.5
I make use of data from 1997/1998, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2005 for answering
both questions. The data contains information on 32,024 households in 1997/98
with 131,477 observations, 24,889 households in 1998/99 with 106,325 observations
and 34,105 households in 1999/2000 with 149,411 observations, 28,268 households
in 2005 with 97,689 observations. Data from these four surveys are comparable as
the same sampling procedure was used in the four surveys. To ensure that the data
are comparable over time, current monetary values had to be deﬂated to base year
prices.6
This data set is appropriate for the analysis since it consists of detailed infor-
mation on every member of the household. For example, I have information on the
education of each member of the household not only by level, but also by years of
schooling. I also have information on region of residence, age, literacy, marital status,
sector of employment and sector. In addition monthly income for those working are
also included. I will explore the range of this dataset in answering the questions
posed. A drawback of the survey is that diﬀerent households are surveyed yearly.7
Nigeria Pre and Post democracy
For most of her independent life, Nigeria has been controlled by the military gov-
ernment, which continued the extractive institutions of colonial rule. The military
government ﬁrst took over in 1966 toppling the elected civilian regime in a coup
d’etat. Several authors have written on the military government in Nigeria and its
negative impact on every sector of the economy.8 Between 1986 and 1998, Nigeria
experienced its worst political regimes since its independence. Political instability,
8pervasive corruption and poor military government with extractive institutions were
the hallmarks of this period. Besides, labor markets were stiﬂed and wages were
sometimes compressed and controlled by the military government. The last military
regime is known to be the most oppressive, corrupt and divisive. This regime ended
abruptly with the death of General Sanni Abacha on the 8th of June 1998.
The death of a person usually makes people sad, but not for many Nigerians who
saw a ray of hope for the future with the demise of Abacha.9 and the beginning of
transition to democracy. The transition government lasted until May 1999. It was
led by General Abdusalam Abubakar, a high-ranking commander in the late general’s
cabinet. It was a period of setting up the institutional and political framework for
the shift to democracy. In May 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo became the president of
Nigeria.
At the inception of the Obasanjo administration in 1999, the morale of Nigerians
was at the lowest ebb because of several problems that characterized the past military
regimes. These problems include: unemployment, high level of corruption, total
decay of infrastructure, malfunctioning public utilities, ineﬃcient state enterprizes
and soaring inﬂation. Within a few months of democratization, political, economic
and institutional areas for reforms, to deal with these issues, were identiﬁed. Over
the next few years, many reforms were initiated including the liberalization of key
sectors of the economy, restructuring of the public service, review of government
budgeting and taxation laws, governance and institutional strengthening, and debt
management.
Along with these reforms, several policies and program were put in place to
improve education and health, reduce women’s disadvantage in the labor market,
9encourage investments and improve labor market outcomes in general. A speciﬁc
example of female empowerment post democracy is the government appointing more
women with expertise into top government positions. The president appointed the
former vice president of World Bank Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, who happened to be a Nige-
rian, as minister of ﬁnance and also appointed Mrs. Akunyili who presently heads
Nigeria’s food and drugs enforcements agency (NAFDAC). In addition, several reg-
ulations were put in place to ensure that political and non political appointments
and government contracts are awarded solely on expertise and education. This is in
contrast to pre-democracy when appointments were more arbitrary and linked mostly
to social networks. Another important action taken by the president was to address
corruption. The government blocked many of the illegal channels of income transfer
from government funds to private accounts. The active campaign against corruption
started in 2003 post the reelection of the president. The federal government has
been actively ﬁghting corruption at higher levels with no ethnic bias. The ﬁring of a
notable minister from the same ethnic group as the president and the arrest of the
inspector general of police in 2005 are evidence of this.
Another big change in Nigeria post democracy is the business climate. Post 1999,
several international ﬁrms returned to Nigeria and new international and local ﬁrms
entered the market. Factors that led to the change in the investment climate include:
large-scale economic reforms, political stability, improvement in enforcing the rule of
law and the existence of a skilled local labor force. The phenomenal growth in the
telecommunication sector and the substantial increase in demand for skilled labor in
the private sector, are the most publicized examples of the impact of post democratic
reforms on labor markets and the economy in Nigeria.
10Though there are diﬀerences in opinion on the impact of the shift to democracy,
the anecdotal and data evidence leans more in favor of positive welfare impacts. There
is data evidence that on average, welfare has improved in Nigeria post democracy
[FOS, 2004]. The issue however is whether or not the shift to democracy improved
the welfare of interest groups in Nigeria equally. In addition, I investigate whether
or not winners and losers emerge in post democratic Nigeria.
Evidence of General Welfare Improvements Post Democ-
racy
As mentioned above, there is macroeconomic evidence of improvements in Nigeria
post democracy. In this section I provide evidence of these general improvements
post democracy using microeconomic data. First in table one, I present summary
statistics of key demographic and economic variables pre and post democracy. I
combine the two datasets pre democracy (1997/98 & 1998/99) and do the same
for the datasets post democracy (2000 & 2005). It is important to present these
averages for several reasons. Most importantly, we need the population surveyed
before democracy to be no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the population surveyed post
democracy. This condition is necessary to attribute changes over the two time periods
to post democratic reform. If not, changes could simply be as a result of changes
in population structure or population sample. The pre and post estimates of the
demographic variables in Table 1 conﬁrm that the population structure did not change
signiﬁcantly. In addition, estimates of mean real income pre and post democracy
provide microeconomic evidence of positive income change post democracy. To be
precise, there was about a 28% increase in real mean income post democracy. This
11is a substantial change but is not entirely unexpected given the rapid changes in
post democratic Nigeria highlighted earlier. To capture the evolution of the change
in income across the population over the four year period, I graph the distribution
of income using a kernel density function for the four years of data used in the
analysis (1998, 1999, 2000 and 2005).10 From Figure two, the rightward shift in
income distribution post democracy (2000 and 2005) is apparent. This result supports
other ﬁndings pointing to general welfare improvement in Nigeria as a whole post
democracy.
Empirical Analysis-Measures of Welfare
There are several ways the welfare of individuals can be characterized. In this paper,
the economic wellbeing of individuals before and after democracy is measured in
ﬁve ways. These ﬁve measures of economic wellbeing or welfare and how they are
estimated are highlighted below.
Change in Mean Income
One way of measuring wellbeing is by looking at individual’s mean income. Real mean
income is computed for all the subgroups considered both before and after democracy,
using 1985 as the base year. I am not interested in mean income per se for the groups
being compared. Also, the initial disparity in income across the interest groups is
not the focus. The point of interest here is if the interest groups being compared
have beneﬁtted equally from democracy in terms of income changes. To answer this
question, the change in mean income of each interest group is computed (see equation







Here j is a subgroup of interest for example women or rural dwellers. t is the time
period pre democracy or post democracy [t=1 pre democracy and t=2 post democ-
racy]. N is the total number of subgroups considered. While ¯ xjt is the mean income
of group j at time t.
∆ ¯ xj = [
¯ xj2 − ¯ xj1
( ¯ xj2 + ¯ xj1)/2
] × 100 (2)
If ∆ ¯ xd > ∆ ¯ xz where d and z represent subgroupsbeing compared, then subgroup d
beneﬁtted more or suﬀered less (if outcome is negative) from changes post democracy.
Measures of Poverty
Poverty is deﬁned and measured in many diﬀerent ways. However, underlining most
deﬁnitions and measures of poverty is a threshold of income, or other measures of well-
being below which individuals are labeled as poor. For this analysis, the poverty line
is equivalent to about a dollar a day. The measures of poverty considered are from the
Fooster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) Index (Fooster-Greer-Thorbecke) commonly called
the Pα class of poverty measures (see equation 3 below). I estimate P0 and P2 for all
subgroups of the population considered, at the two time periods. P0 is also known
as the head count ratio while P2 captures the severity of poverty. P2 is used as a
standard poverty measure by the World Bank. It is sensitive to distribution among
the poor and satisﬁes standard criteria of a good poverty measure. Usually, poverty
measures are estimated using household expenditure. Unfortunately, the GHS data
set has information on income but not expenditure. Hence, I calculate these mea-
13sures using household income. I do not envisage signiﬁcant issues with using income
instead of expenditure because of the strong correlation between expenditure and
income in Nigeria. For example, an over 90% correlation was noted between income











Here α is 0 or 2. H is the head count. Yp is the poverty line. j is the subgroup being
considered, Y is income and t is the time dispensation (pre or post democracy).
As above, we calculate the change in these poverty measures over these two time




] × 100 (4)
Similar to the analysis for mean income above, if the change in a poverty measure
for a group is greater than the comparison group, this group is said to have beneﬁtted
more (or suﬀered less) post democracy in Nigeria.11
Inequality
Inequality can be measured in several ways. Some of the most commonly used mea-
sures include the Gini coeﬃcient Gini (1912), the decile ratio, the Atkinson index
[Atkinson (1970); and Theil’s entropy [Theil (1967) ]. In this analysis, I calclate
income inequality within subgroups of interest using the Gini coeﬃcient. The Gini
is calculated by taking diﬀerence between all pairs of incomes and then totalling the
absolute diﬀerences. This total absolute diﬀerence is then normalized by dividing
14by population (squared) and average income (see equation 5). For this analysis, the
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  = ¯ xjt is the mean income for a group at time t. Similar to the mean and poverty




] × 100 (6)
In the case of the ∆Gj, if ∆Gj > 0 then inequality has increased for the group and if
∆Gj < 0 inequality has decreased for the group. ∆Gj < 0 is a positive outcome that
reﬂects a reduction in inequality. In contrast, if ∆Gj > 0 for all j being compared,
the smaller the ∆Gj the better the outcome with respect to changes in inequality.12
Probability of Employment
The next measure of welfare considered is the probability of employment. The prob-
ability of employment is computed for each of the groups of interest before and after
democracy (see equation seven). First, the probability of being unemployed or not
working Pr(Uemp) is calculated. This ratio is conditional on not being in school,
not keeping the home and not being involved in voluntary work.
Pr[Empjt = 1] = [1 − Pr(Empjt = 0)|v] (7)
Where Emp means employed and v is individual not in school, not a home keeper or
involved in voluntary work.
15The change in probability of employment for each subgroup between the two
regimes is also calculated as in equation 8. If ∆Pr(Empjt = 1) > 0, then the
probability of being unemployed has fallen post democracy. If three groups a, b
and c in the population are being compared, if ∆Pr(Empct = 1) > ∆Pr(Empbt =
1) > ∆Pr(Empat = 1). Then group c has experienced the largest positive change in
employment probability.
∆Pr(Empjt = 1) = [
Pr(Empj2 = 1) − Pr(Empj1 = 1)
(Pr(Empj1 = 1) + Pr(Empj2 = 1))/2
] × 100 (8)
Returns to Education
To estimate the returns to education for groups considered, two functional forms of
the wage equation are used. First, the average returns to education (ARTE) are esti-
mated using ordinary least squares (OLS) on a simple Mincer type earnings function
(equation 9) for each time period and for diﬀerent groups. The groups considered are
gender (male vs female), region (northeast (NE), southeast (SE), southwest (SW),
south-south (SS), northwest (NW) and mid-belt (MB)), sector(urban vs rural) and
cohort of birth.
log(yijt) = α + βjtSijt + φjtXijt + κjtX2
ijt + ρjtDijt + ǫijt (9)
Here Xijt is age of individual i in group j at time t , Sijt is years of schooling of
individual i in group j at time t and Dijt are all other possible exogenous/control
variables including dummies for individual i in group j at time t and yijt is income
of individual i in group j at time t .
The returns to education are also estimated at each level of education using
16another form of the Mincer equation (see equation 10). With this functional form,
the returns to an extra year of schooling for primary, secondary and tertiary education
can be estimated.
log(Y ) = α2 + γX + δX2 + ̺yrpri + ϕyrsec + ςyruniv + λ2Z + ǫ2 (10)
where Y is a vector of incomes, X is a vector of age, Z is the matrix of all relevant
control variables and year dummies, yrpri is years of primary education, yrsec is years
of secondary education and yruniv is years of tertiary education.
It is important to mention that the returns to schooling estimate (β,̺,ϕ,ς) in
equation 9 and 10 estimated using OLS, potentially suﬀer from endogeniety and
omitted variable bias. Typically to deal with this problem, the return to schooling
is re-estimated using instrumental variables in a two stage least squares framework.
In Uwaifo (2006), the ARTE in Nigeria pre and post democracy are estimated using
the IV approach. She notes no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in estimates using the IV and
the OLS methods. The inference from this result is that OLS estimates, of ARTE,
in the Nigerian case are not biased. Based on this ﬁnding, I assume that OLS
estimates of ARTE for subgroups in Nigeria are likewise not biased. There is a
slight possibility however that this assumption might be invalid. However, given that
the interest in this analysis is comparison across groups with respect to change in
economic indicators, inference can still be valid even if bias in OLS estimates exist.
For inference to be valid in the mist of potential bias in OLS estimates, bias must not
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for comparison groups. For example, the bias in the OLS
estimate of ARTE for women should be equal to the bias in the OLS estimates for
men.13
17For the estimation of returns to education at the diﬀerent levels of education,
Uwaifo (2006) does not show if OLS estimates of return to education at each level of
education are biased or not.14 The OLS estimates at the diﬀerent levels of education
may not be biased given the lack of bias in estimates of ARTE for Nigeria. How-
ever, the possibility of biased estimates cannot be ruled out given that ability aﬀects
level of education attainment and is not controlled for in this analysis. Despite this
constraint, given our interest is the comparison among education levels in changes
in returns, the inferences are valid whether or not estimates are biased if bias is not
time variant.15
Like with the other measures of welfare highlighted earlier, the change in ARTE
over time for each group excluding the education categories is calculated (see equa-
tion 11). The change in the returns to each level of education is also calculated using
equation 12-14. Positive changes in ARTE imply improvements in returns to educa-
tion post democracy. However, the magnitudes of these changes are more important
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18Results
Results for Mean Income
Table two and three present the results for the mean real income pre and post democ-
racy. As expected, males earn more than women and this trend continued post
democracy. Unfortunately, the gap between male and female mean income is on the
rise. The male to female earning gap increased post democracy by 23 real naira.
This ﬁnding is saddening given that one of the goals of the democratic government
was to reduce gender disparities signiﬁcantly. The results for the urban and rural
comparison is equally worrisome. Once again, policy attempts to reduce sector gaps
in income by the democratic government seems ineﬀective. The rural to urban in-
come gap increased post democracy by about 25 real naira. With respect to regional
comparisons, the results are mixed. The income gap between some regions reduced
while the gap increased between some other regions. For example, the gap between
the NE and the SW, SS, SE and MB decreased. However, the income gap between
the NE and the NC increased post democracy. Though all regions showed signiﬁ-
cant increase in income post democracy(> 20%), the big winners are the NE and
SW.16 With respect to level of education, there is marked disparities in beneﬁts from
democracy. The income gap across levels of education increased substantially. The
big winners are those with tertiary education who saw an over 50% increase in their
income on average post democracy. Individuals with secondary education also ex-
perienced signiﬁcant increases in income post democracy. However, the income gap
between those with tertiary education and those without increased by over 75 real
naira. Similar dynamics are noted when birth cohorts are compared. The income
gap between some cohorts increased (1931-1940 vs 1941-1950) and the income gap
19between some cohorts decreased (1961-1970 vs other older cohorts). Some of the dif-
ferences across cohorts are expected given general earning proﬁles over the life time
of an individual. For example, we do not expect to see substantial changes in income
for those born before 1930 because many of them have retired and post democracy,
even more would have retired. Hence, that a positive increase in income is noted for
the oldest cohort, points to the wide spread nature of income increases across groups
post democracy in Nigeria.
It is important to note that mean income rose for all subgroups of the population
considered. Which shows that in terms of income on average, no important group is
doing worse post democracy. However, it is clear that there is substantial disparity
across groups in how mean income changed post democracy.
Poverty Analysis Results
Table four and ﬁve highlight the computed poverty indices across groups and the
change over the two periods considered. The results in this table are similar for some
group comparisons but diﬀerent for others. First, the number of people under the
poverty line decreased generally for all groups (in most cases over 10% decrease in
head count ratio). Also, the severity of poverty measured by P2 decreased for all
groups considered. However, disparities in changes to poverty indices exist across
groups. Take for example gender, the gap in the head count ratio between males
and females decreased post democracy which is good. However, men experienced a
greater decrease than women in the severity of poverty. For the sector comparisons,
poverty decreased substantially more in the urban than the rural areas. Hence, the
gap in poverty between the rural and urban areas has increased signiﬁcantly post
20democracy despite general decrease in poverty in both sectors.
The results of the region comparisons are also interesting given the results on
mean income previously highlighted. The drop in the head count ratio in the SW is
substantially larger than for other regions. The NE, that experienced the greatest
rise in mean income, ranked 4th in terms of reduction in head count but ranked
highest in reduction in the severity of poverty. This result might point to disparate
beneﬁts from democracy within this region or highlight the severity of poverty in this
region prior to democracy.17 With respect to education levels, the results are similar
to that of mean income. Poverty has drastically reduced for those with tertiary
education which is driven partly by the rapid increase in income post democracy.
The signiﬁcant improvement in the welfare of those with tertiary education comes as
no surprise given the policies and reforms post democracy, which have direct impact
on those with higher education. Across the cohorts, the highest decline in the head
count ratio was among those in the 1971-1980 birth cohort. This change might be
due to the fact that many in this cohort are just entering the job market at this time
while prior to democracy, part of this cohort were still in school. Hence it is hard to
diﬀerentiate for this cohort the eﬀect of democracy from the normal school to work
earning transition.
Results of Inequality Estimation
The estimation of inequality within subgroups and the change in this inequality yields
interesting results (see Table 6). One of the surprising results is the marked increase in
inequality within each group post democracy. The increase in inequality as reﬂected
in the positive change of the Gini coeﬃcient is not an isolated change for one subgroup
21but is consistent over all the subgroups of the population considered. In this case,
there are no winners with respect to reducing within group inequality post democracy.
However it is possible to diﬀerentiate the size of the increase across groups. For
instance when comparing men to women, inequality among men increased at a slower
rate than women. Prior to democracy, inequality in income among women was less
than inequality in income among men. Things have changed post democracy, women
now have greater inequality in income than men. Speciﬁcally, women experienced
about a 10 percentage point more increase in inequality than men. The results for
the sector comparisons are also interesting. Inequality in income in the rural areas
increased faster than in the urban areas (about 10 percentage point more). This
result may suggest that programs implemented post democracy, to improve welfare
of rural dwellers, had selective impact.
With respect to region comparisons, the increase in inequality within each region
is similar [range between 11-16%]. The Northern regions continued to have higher
inequality than the Southern regions. However, the NE and NC regions experienced
lower increases in inequality. Turning our attention to education levels, the results
show that inequality increased least amoung those with tertiary education.18 This
ﬁnding may seem surprising given the massive increase in income post democracy
for this group. However, given the fact that labor market opportunities increased for
this level of education substantially, and those with tertiary education are the main
beneﬁciaries of many labor market reforms post democracy, the result are explain-
able. With respect to birth cohorts, the results show substantial diﬀerences in the
magnitude of increase in inequality across cohorts. Older cohorts experienced smaller
changes in inequality than the younger birth cohorts.
22Results on Changes in Employment
Table 7 captures the probability of employment pre and post democracy and the
change in the probability. The general ﬁnding from this table is consistent with
some of the post democratic reforms. Employment increased for most groups in the
population. However, the concern here is the diﬀerence in change across comparison
groups in the population. For example, the probability of employment conditional on
not being a home maker, in school or involved in volunteer work, (probability of paid
employment) increased for women post democracy while for men there was no change.
This result may point to the eﬀectiveness of female empowerment programs post
democracy. Post democracy, the gap in the probability of employment for men and
women deceased by 5 percentage point. As expected the probability of employment
in the rural areas is higher than the urban areas.19 Table 6 shows that despite the
increase in employment in the urban areas, the gap in employment between the two
sectors increased post democracy. A surprising result is the diﬀerence across regions
in the changes post democracy in employment. All the northern regions of Nigeria
experienced a boost in employment probability. In contrast, the southern regions
experienced no change (SE) or negative changes. No easy explanations comes to mind
for why these diﬀerences. Hence, there is need for further investigation. The results
when comparing probability of employment across education levels is also interesting.
Despite the ﬁndings that those with tertiary education had beneﬁtted more than
other levels from reforms post democracy, probability of employment for this group
remained the same. Surprisingly, those at primary levels of education experienced the
greatest increase in employability post reforms. Prior to democracy, the probability
of employment was higher for those with tertiary education than those with primary
23education. However, the substantial increase in employability for individuals with
primary school level attainment post democracy has led to higher probability of
employment for this group than the tertiary educated. The change in employability
for the diﬀerent cohorts is more diﬃcult to interpret. This is because changes in
employability are a result of both the reforms and normal life cycle transition to
work, and out of work for diﬀerent birth cohorts.
Results for Estimating Returns to Education
The returns to education estimates for each subgroup is presented in Table 8 and
9. Recall as earlier mentioned that the point estimates of ARTE may be biased if
our earlier stated assumptions do not hold. Based on the types of reforms that took
place post democracy, high returns to education is hypothesized. The results in ta-
ble 8 and 9 ﬁrst point to the substantial positive changes in ARTE across groups
post democracy. Interestingly, the gender analysis shows that women experienced a
higher increase in ARTE post democracy than men (about 5% point). The result
for the sector comparison is also surprising. The ARTE rose more in the rural than
the urban areas. Hence, the returns to education gap between the sectors reduced
post democracy. For the regional comparisons, the ARTE gap between regions de-
creased. Meaning there is less variance in the ARTE among regions post democratic
reform. The South-South region and the Northeast experienced the largest jump in
returns post democracy overtaking regions like the Southeast and Southwest. For the
comparison across cohorts, cohorts born after 1940 experienced similar increases in
ARTE. Another interesting observation from the cohort break down is the positive
relationship between ARTE and birth cohort for those born after 1940 (the older the
24cohort the higher the ARTE). It appears that ARTE varies over the life cycle and this
trend is captured in the varying returns to diﬀerent birth cohorts at a given period
in time.
The results with respect to returns at diﬀerent levels of education is consistent
with inference from other measures. Prior to democracy, ARTE were low at all
levels but post democracy, the returns to education for those with higher education
is relatively high. The gap in ARTE has also increased between those with tertiary
education and those with lower levels of education. With a greater increase in the gap
between those who are tertiary educated and those who have secondary education.
A 5% point increase in returns to education for those with tertiary education is
substantial given that returns to education only rose by 1.2% points for the other
levels of education. The target recipients of some key reforms (both labor market and
other reforms) post democracy are the well educated (those with tertiary education).
Hence, the preceding result is not entirely surprising. Nevertheless, it is fascinating
to know that reforms can lead to returns to education increases. 20
Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, several welfare and labor market outcome indicators are estimated pre
and pro democracy with the goal of answering two questions. First are there sub-
stantial diﬀerences in the economic impact of democracy across subgroups? Second
are there winners and losers post democracy in Nigeria in terms of labor market
outcomes?
With respect to the ﬁrst question, the answer is yes. This conclusion is based
on comparing the percentage change in returns to education post democracy across
25groups for statistic and economic signiﬁcance. Some of these results have been high-
lighted in the previous sections. Three important examples of these disparities in the
impact of democracy are highlighted below. First, the diﬀerential impact of democ-
racy on mean income across education levels (over 20% point diﬀerence in impact
comparing those with tertiary education and other levels).21 Second, the diﬀerential
impact of democracy on returns to education across regions and levels of education
(percentage change in returns to education diﬀered by over 20% point between some
regions and also between some levels of education). Lastly, the diﬀerential impact of
democracy on poverty reduction across levels of education (over 15% point diﬀerence
in impact comparing tertiary to other levels of education).
With regards to the second question, the answer depends on how we deﬁne a
winner or a loser. If a loser is deﬁned as a negative impact post democracy and a
winner a positive outcome, then for most measures of welfare, there are no losers
post democracy in Nigeria. The exceptions are as follows. First, the probability of
employment in the South-South and South West decreased post democracy. Second,
the probability of employment decreased for the two oldest cohorts post democracy.
This result is less worrisome than the ﬁrst because of the birth cohorts for which this
negative change is noted. Individuals in these cohorts may simply just be retiring.
The more important negative outcome post democracy is the rise in inequality across
all groups considered. Inequality in income increased diﬀerently across groups but
increased for all groups considered. Increases in inequality post democratization is
not unexpected. There are both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that
point to a relationship between democracy and inequality (see Lenski (1966), Justman
and Gradstein, (1999), Simpson (1990), Gradstein and Milanovic (2004)). However,
26this increase in inequality post democracy is an important result that needs to be
highlighted.
Deﬁning winners and losers post democracy diﬀerently from above, leads to other
conclusion. For example, a winner when comparing subgroups can be deﬁned as
one who experiences the statistically signiﬁcant greatest or greater positive change
in measurable outcome post democracy. While the loser is one who experiences the
statistically signiﬁcant lowest or lower change in measurable outcome post democracy.
See Table 10 for a summary of winners and losers based on this deﬁnition/criteria.
Using these deﬁnitions of winner and losers, Table 10 highlights diﬀerent winners
and losers post democracy in Nigeria depending on the economic indicator. For
changes in mean income, the winners are men, urban dwellers, the Northeast, tertiary
educated and the 1961-70 birth cohort. In terms of losers, women, rural dwellers,
Southeast, incomplete primary educated, and the oldest birth cohort. In contrast,
for changes in returns to education, the big winners are female, rural, Northeast,
tertiary educated and the 1961-1970 birth cohort. Given these diﬀerences depending
on the measure used, stating general winners or losers post democracy in Nigeria is
diﬃcult. However, tertiary educated individuals and the Northeast region are the
two groups that are winners consistently over most indicators. In conclusion, reforms
post democracy led to diﬀerential welfare impacts for subgroups of the population.
Despite these disparities in beneﬁts, the good news is that welfare as measured by
income, ARTE, employment and poverty reduction improved for most subgroups of
the population considered.
In conclusion, the results above provide signiﬁcant evidence that the big winners
post democracy in Nigeria are those with tertiary education and those from the
27Northeast. The result for the tertiary educated as mentioned above is explainable
given the focus of the reforms. The result for the Northeast however needs further
investigation. The vice president and some key government oﬃcials come form the
Northeast of Nigeria. Biased transfers to this region from those in power might
explain this trend but this conclusion is speculative.
Finally based on the ﬁndings in this paper, Nigeria’s government needs to target
speciﬁc groups of the population in an attempt to reduce the gap in welfare beneﬁts of
democracy which may keep growing over time if unchecked. This is important because
civil unrest is an impediment to growth and is positively related to growing disparities
within a population. In addition, policies and programs aimed at closing the gender
gap in income are necessary. Similarly, growing disparity in income among women
needs to be investigated.22 Finally, though tertiary educated individuals are without
doubt the big winners post democracy in Nigeria, the probability of employment
has not changed. There is still a 9% probability of being unemployed with higher
education in Nigeria which is signiﬁcant. The government needs to target raising
employability not only for tertiary educated graduates, but for those with secondary
education who presently have the highest probability of being unemployed (12%).
28Notes
1The previous democratic government lasted four years between 1979-1983.
2Figure one is a map of Nigeria showing the regions in Nigeria: Southeast(SE), Southwest (SW),
Mid Belt (MB), South-South(SS), North-Central (NC) and Northeast (NE).
3Milesi-ferretti, Perotti and Rostangno (2002) study using a panel of OECD countries, Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu et al (2004), Rodrik and Rigobon (2004), Minier (1998) and Glaeser
et al (2004) are examples of such papers.
4They examine how the rise of a market economy in urban China redeﬁnes the rules governing
economic activities though they also look at the eﬀects on earnings inequality.
5Note diﬀerent household in each enumeration area are interviewed in each quarter.
6The base year is 1985.
7For the ﬁrst quarter of 1998/99 the data set was not available.
8Examples of authors on this subject are Dibie (2000), Nwagwu (2002)& Sanda et al (1987).
9Recently US$770 million of stolen state cash was recovered from Abacha’s family.
10Log income is used in the kernel density graphing.
11This is dependent on if the change is positive or negative.
12Here I assume inequality is a “bad” society wants less of.
13The assumption of equal bias is not farfetched. If we believe that ability is the omitted variable
in the regression analysis leading to potential bias in the OLS estimates, we do not expect the
distribution of ability to diﬀer across groups being compared.
14She is not able to use the IV approach for the estimation across levels because she has only
one instrument and would not be able to satisfy exclusion restriction given the existence of three
potentially endogenous variables.
15There is no reason to believe that a bias in the estimate of the returns to a particular level of
education, if it exists, will change over time.
16Interestingly, the President post democracy is from the SW and the vice president is from the
NE.
17In the results on within group inequality, this issue is revisited.
18Those with incomplete education are the only group that did not experience an increase in
inequality.
19Higher levels of employment is usually noted in rural areas given the agricultural nature of the
sector. The challenge however is underemployment.
20In Uwaifo(2006), the author shows why changes in return to education can be attributed to
reforms post democracy.
21By impact, I am referring to the change in a measure over the two time periods. Making the
assumption that the change is driven by action taken post democracy.
22The rising returns to education for women might explain the rising disparities in income among
women but this hypothesis is yet to be carefully investigated.
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32Appendix
Figure 1: Geopolitical Regions in Nigeria
Color Code: Red-Southeast(SE), Light Green-Southwest (SW), Purple- Mid Belt (MB), Pink-
South-South(SS) , Sea green-North Central (NC) and Dark blue-Northeast (NE).
33Table 1: Summary Statistics
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35Table 2: Mean Income Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆
(S.D) (S.D)
Gender
Male 102.13 142.64 33.1%
(242.69) (283.63)
Female 71.98 89.49 21.7%
(254.59) (231.75)
Sector
Urban 112.98 163.23 36.4%
(155.07) (200.8)
Rural 85.24 110.27 25.60%
(274.4) (284.91)
Region
North East 84.23 126.13 39.8%
(403.16) (352.82)
North Central 80.65 104.52 25.8%
(201.41) (152.6)
Mid Belt 96.92 121.99 22%
(188.23) (289.02)
South East 97.88 122.0 21.9%
(133.4) (250.72)
South West 97.04 131.90 30.45%
(96.22) (175.89)
South South 101.45 131.55 25.8%
(336.95) (313.86)
*Note mean income here is for those who are employed and earned income.
36Table 3: Mean Income Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆
(S.D) (S.D)
Education Level
No Schooling 78.1 93.70 18.16 %
(255.10) (232.38)
Incomplete primary 103.81 106.77 2.82%
(584.49) (191.31)
Primary 95.93 119.19 21.62%
(143.24) (270.51)
Secondary 115.32 156.61 30.37%
(135.77) (277.11)
Tertiary 165.3 282.45 52.33%
(205.39) (409.32)
Age Cohort
< 1931 93.42 101.51 8.3%
(175.29) (119.26)
1931-1940 97.5 122.31 22.6%
(301.2) (331.38)
1941-1950 103.42 135.52 26.9%
(426.05) (271.24)
1951-1960 95.91 138.54 36.4%
(170.3) (290.67)
1961-1970 89.14 130.65 37.8%
(158.65) (284.27)
1971-1980 76.2 106.62 33.3%
(117.35) (218.26)
> 1980 50.79 52.72 3.7%
(47.02) (91.75)
*Note mean income here is for those working.
37Table 4: Poverty Measures Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Dem Post Dem % Pre D. Post D. %
(S.E) (S.E) △% (S.E) (S.E) △
Head Count Ratio (P0) Poverty Severity (P2)
Gender
Male 0.78 0.670 -15.17 0.3 0.24 -22.22
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.800 0.680 -16.22 0.3 0.25 -18.18
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector
Urban 0.620 0.470 -27.52 0.19 0.14 -30.30
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural 0.840 0.740 -12.66 0.34 0.28 -19.35
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Region
NE 0.900 0.770 -15.57 0.41 0.31 -27.78
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
NC 0.910 0.810 -11.63 0.42 0.34 -21.05
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
MB 0.810 0.710 -13.16 0.29 0.25 -14.81
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
SE 0.700 0.580 -18.75 0.23 0.18 -24.39
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
SW 0.550 0.420 -26.80 0.12 0.11 -8.70
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
SS 0.710 0.600 -16.79 0.22 0.19 -14.63
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
*Note: Poverty is calculated using income and not expenditure.
38Table 5: Poverty Measures Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Dem Post Dem % Pre D. Post D. %
(S.E) (S.E) △ (S.E) (S.E) △
Head Count Ratio (P0) Severity of Poverty(P2)
Education Level
No Sch. 0.860 0.770 -11.04 0.36 0.30 -18.18
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1-5yrs. 0.800 0.690 -14.77 0.29 0.26 -10.91
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary 0.710 0.600 -16.79 0.23 0.19 -19.05
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Sec. 0.540 0.430 -22.68 0.15 0.13 -14.29
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Tertiary 0.440 0.310 -34.67 0.15 0.11 -30.77
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Cohort
< 1931 0.730 0.670 -8.57 0.3 0.27 -10.53
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
1931-1940 0.710 0.620 -13.53 0.24 0.22 -8.70
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
1941-1950 0.730 0.620 -16.30 0.25 0.21 -17.39
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
1951-1960 0.750 0.630 -17.39 0.27 0.22 -20.41
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
1961-1970 0.720 0.620 -14.93 0.26 0.23 -12.24
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
1971-1980 0.750 0.610 -20.59 0.28 0.22 -24.00
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
> 1980 0.850 0.720 -16.56 0.34 0.26 -26.67
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
39Table 6: Gini Coeﬃcient Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆ Winners
Gender
Male 0.44 0.49 10.75
Female 0.41 0.51 21.74
Sector
Urban 0.42 0.45 6.90
Rural 0.44 0.52 16.67
Region
North East 0.49 0.55 11.54
North Central 0.45 0.51 12.50
Mid Belt 0.45 0.53 16.33
South East 0.42 0.49 15.38
South West 0.40 0.47 16.09
South South 0.43 0.49 13.04
Education Level
No Schooling 0.44 0.50 12.77
Incomplete primary 0.49 0.49 0.00
Primary 0.41 0.47 13.64
Secondary 0.40 0.44 9.52
Tertiary 0.41 0.42 2.41
Age Cohort
< 1931 0.45 0.47 4.35
1931-1940 0.46 0.51 10.31
1941-1950 0.47 0.50 6.19
1951-1960 0.44 0.49 10.75
1961-1970 0.42 0.49 15.38
1971-1980 0.42 0.50 17.39
> 1980 0.36 0.66 58.82
40Table 7: Probability of Employment Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆
Gender
Male 0.94 0.94 0.00
Female 0.87 0.92 5.59
Sector
Urban 0.89 0.90 1.12
Rural 0.92 0.94 2.15
Region
North East 0.92 0.96 4.26
North Central 0.92 0.96 4.26
Mid Belt 0.90 0.95 5.41
South East 0.91 0.91 0.00
South West 0.93 0.92 -1.08
South South 0.89 0.87 -2.27
Education Level
No Schooling 0.92 0.93 1.08
Incomplete primary 0.90 0.95 5.41
Primary 0.90 0.96 6.45
Secondary 0.87 0.88 1.14
Tertiary 0.91 0.91 0.00
Age Cohort
< 1931 0.76 0.70 -8.22
1931-1940 0.94 0.90 -4.35
1941-1950 0.98 0.98 0.00
1951-1960 0.98 0.99 1.02
1961-1970 0.95 0.99 4.12
1971-1980 0.80 0.92 13.95
> 1980 0.63 0.79 22.54
41Table 8: Return to schooling Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆
(S.D) (S.D)
Gender
Male 0.027 0.041 41.18
(0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.033 0.053 46.51
(0.001) (0.001)
Sector
Urban 0.036 0.050 32.56
(0.001) (0.001)
Rural 0.026 0.043 49.28
(0.001) (0.001)
Region
North East 0.027 0.049 57.89
(0.002) (0.002)
North Central 0.030 0.043 35.62
(0.001) (0.002)
Mid Belt 0.024 0.038 45.16
(0.040) (0.001)
South East 0.037 0.046 21.69
(0.001) (0.002)
South West 0.034 0.044 25.64
(0.001) (0.001)
South South 0.028 0.048 52.63
(0.001) (0.002)
42Table 9: Returns to Schooling Pre and Post Democracy
Variable Pre Democracy Post democracy %∆
(s.e) (s.e)
Education Level
Primary 0.020 0.032 46.15
(0.001) (0.001)
Secondary 0.036 0.048 28.57
(0.001) (0.001)
Tertiary 0.062 0.112 57.47
(0.003) (0.004)
Cohort
< 1931 0.034 0.043 23.38
(0.004) (0.004)
1931-1940 0.034 0.039 13.70
(0.002) (0.003)
1941-1950 0.033 0.051 42.86
(0.001) (0.002)
1951-1960 0.031 0.048 43.04
(0.001) (0.001)
1961-1970 0.027 0.046 52.05
(0.001) (0.001)
1971-1980 0.023 0.036 44.07
(0.020) (0.001)
> 1980 NA 0.024
(0.001)
*NA-Not applicable.
43Table 10: Tabulating Winners and Losers
Variable Winner Loser
Gender
Mean Income Male Female
Head count ratio of Poverty Female Male
Severity of poverty [P2] Male Female
Gini Coeﬃcient Male Female
Probability of Employment Female Male
Returns to Education Female Male
Sector
Mean Income Urban Rural
Head count ratio of Poverty Urban Rural
Severity of poverty [P2] Urban Rural
Gini Coeﬃcient Urban Rural
Probability of Employment Rural Urban
Returns to Education Rural Urban
Region
Mean Income NE SE
Head count ratio of Poverty SW NC
Severity of poverty [P2] NE SW
Gini Coeﬃcient NE MB
Probability of Employment MB SS
Returns to Education NE SE
Education Level
Mean Income Tertiary Incomplete primary
Head count ratio of Poverty Tertiary No Schooling
Severity of poverty [P2] Tertiary Incomplete primary
Gini Coeﬃcient Incomplete primary Primary
Probability of Employment Primary Incomplete primary
Returns to Education Tertiary Primary
Age Cohort
Mean Income 1961-1970 > 1980
Head count ratio of Poverty 1971-80 < 1930
Severity of poverty [P2] > 1980 1931-40
Gini Coeﬃcient < 1930 > 1980
Probability of Employment > 1980 < 1931
Returns to Education 1961-70 1931-40
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